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The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic piles crisis atop crisis. As confirmed infection rates
cross 2.5 million and attributed deaths pass 170,000 (at time of writing, in April
2020), it is increasingly being accepted that biodiversity loss has reduced the
resilience of natural systems when faced with the emergence of new diseases. At
the same time, ever closer contact between humans and animals (through intensive
farming, habitat encroachment and other factors) has increased the likelihood
of diseases arising in animals crossing into human populations, becoming novel
‘zoonoses’ (diseases transmitted from animals to humans) against which no one has
an acquired immunity. Zoonoses are the sharp end of the wedge: they are but one—
and hardly the most concerning—of the many threats biodiversity loss poses to our
societies.
Set in today’s context, a third level of crisis—that of irreversible climate change—
continues not only to present a threat to human life and health in its own right, but
serves as a driver and multiplier of biodiversity loss and the degradation of natural
systems. Although COVID-19 is expected to produce the largest ever annual fall in
CO2 emissions, the overall trend of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere remains
stubbornly upward, with March 2020 recording an average of 414.50 ppm CO2 in
the atmosphere at the Mauna Loa observatory, compared to 411.97 ppm in March of
2019.
As international legal scholars, we want to reflect on the potential and limitations of
the object of our shared professional engagement: international law. Can it play a
positive role in averting and tackling this present and worsening injustice? In this
two-part post, we make two contributions to this special symposium, as to identify
two key areas where international lawyers need to consider the potential for our
discipline to contribute strategically to the fight against climate change, bringing the
normative potential of international law to bear as an instrument or forum for global
collective action against this phenomenon.
This first Part relates to the substance of primary rules of international environmental
law, and its ability to grasp, apprehend and capture the complexity of phenomena
such as carbon emissions collectively. Faced with the absence of clear obligations
under the Paris Agreement, we offer some preliminary reflections on the potential
of the No Harm rule (which we will capitalise here as ‘No Harm’ for emphasis) in
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allocating climate change mitigation obligations; which could be a likely subject of
future litigation. The second Part of this post will address the tactics available under
international law: Faced with persistently slow progress of international negotiations,
combined with States’ disappointing responses to the Paris Agreement’s strategy
of nationally determined contributions, the focus is increasingly turning to strategic
litigation, which involves the conscious design of legal claims to advance the
clarification, respect, protection and fulfilment of climate change mitigation
obligations. In the second part, we will reflect on the potential advantages and
challenges of international adjudication in judging climate change obligations, with a
particular focus on the option of a contentious case before the ICJ.
Primary obligations to combat climate change: the content of a shared No
Harm obligation
The last few decades of international climate negotiations have demonstrated
that States (major emitters in particular) are patently unwilling to agree to a legal
framework that specifies the scope and content of State obligations to combat
dangerous climate change. While it has been recognised that holding the increase
in global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and
pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
will significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change (Paris Agreement,
Article 2(1)(a)), it remains unresolved what each State is legally required to do in
order to achieve this common goal.
In the context of catastrophic climate change legal analysis must understand State
responsibility collectively: as shared responsibility. Climate change can only be truly
tackled by the collective efforts of many (if not all), and it will be impossible to trace
a particular harm caused by climate change to the conduct of any single State. It
should be noted at the outset that one may certainly find a degree of recognition of
this shared responsibility in the climate change regime: see for example the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities reflected in Articles 3(1) and 4(1)
UNFCC. This inescapable collective dimension gives rise to various legal challenges
not only at the level of allocating primary obligations (as will be discussed in this first
Part), but also at the level of adjudicating climate change and seeking remedies in a
future contentious case (to be discussed in Part II). These challenges are not in the
least due to the obstacle of causation, a notion which remains understudied in the
law of international responsibility in general and international environmental law in
particular.
The No Harm obligation is likely the primary candidate to ground the argument that
States should do more to prevent dangerous climate change. No Harm has long
been international environmental law’s workhorse; it is a catch-all, which restrains
action within States’ territories even in the absence of a specific prohibition, where
those activities cause significant harm in the territory of other States. Originally
articulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration, it was included in the (soft law) Stockholm
and Rio declarations of 1972 (principle 21) and 1992 (principle 2). In its 1996
advisory opinion in Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ confirmed that
the obligation to ensure that activities within a State’s jurisdiction respect the
environment of other States or of areas beyond national control has the status of
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customary international law (at paragraph 29). In the absence of more specific norms
in the major climate change conventions which could give rise to a cause of action, it
seems likely that the No Harm rule will again be pressed into service in this domain.
Prima facie, No Harm appears promising. Climate change is indisputably causing
harm—and will increasingly do so—to States at a level which is “significant”. But
discerning the normative content of that obligation to judge the concrete behaviour
of one State will not be an easy task. This is in the first place because the nature
of the obligation is inherently flexible. As an obligation of conduct, the No Harm
rule requires a State to take reasonable measures to prevent activities within its
jurisdiction from causing serious transboundary damage, but does not specify the
precise form such measures should take. Rather, States are required to act with due
diligence to prevent the activities within their jurisdictions from causing significant
harm to the territories of others (see Pulp Mills, paragraph 101).
Due Diligence
Yet the standards of conduct demanded by due diligence also remain to be clarified
in this field, and may vary from case to case, dependent for example on the
capabilities of the duty-bearer in question. Bodansky, Brunnée and Rajamani have
highlighted the concern that the ‘evolution of the UN Climate regime may have
made it easier for States to demonstrate their due diligence’ by implicitly linking that
standard to the achievement of the goals the State sets for itself in its Nationally
Determined Contribution under the Paris Agreement (see their International Climate
Change Law (OUP 2017), at p. 45-46). In such a reading of the standard, a State
need do no more than meet the threshold of action it has set for itself (however
low that be) to have acted with “due diligence”, which is clearly, as they indicate,
insufficient.
In the context of international adjudication, the No Harm rule has been forged in the
context of classical bilateralism; applied to situations where activities on one State’s
territory cause serious environmental harm to one other State. The fact that, when
it comes to combatting climate change, this obligation is incumbent on all States
simultaneously will surely complicate any exercise aimed at interpreting the content
of that obligation. Since only the concerted efforts of States will stand a chance at
preventing the transboundary harm caused by climate change, the content of the No
Harm obligation for one respondent State may very well be influenced by what can
reasonably be expected of other duty-bearers in their collective pursuit of reducing
the risk of dangerous climate change. An interesting question would be whether
the no-harm rule in the context of climate change requires States, as part of the
reasonable measures they are expected to take, to engage with one another and
take those measures that are available to them to ensure that other States do their
part, considering in particular that any (future) harm caused would be the result of
the conduct of many States.
Causation
Importantly, in order to establish a violation of the obligation to prevent
transboundary harm, a causal link will need to be established between the activities
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occurring within a respondent State’s jurisdiction and the (potential) harm caused
by climate change. The first step would be scientific causation, in which it must
be shown that the direct harm caused to the applicant State (or, indeed, to global
commons) – be it rising sea levels, drought, extreme weather, or any of many other
effects – is indeed the result of human-induced climate change. As Evangelidis
has discussed on this blog, that link is far from straightforward to draw, requiring as
it does the uneasy marrying together of scientific probabilistic standards of proof
with law’s demand for certainty. ICJ case law is hardly encouraging. In Pulp Mills
(para 162), an environmental dispute, the Court insisted on well-worn principle of
onus probandi incumbit actori – the burden of proof laying on the party making an
allegation. In Application of the Genocide Convention (Croatia v Serbia), the ICJ
insisted in that evidence be “fully conclusive” (para 178) in situations where the
charges are of ‘exceptional gravity’, though it is possible that the latter would be
restricted to a breach of a peremptory norm.
Moreover, it would be necessary to show that activities within any particular
respondent State’s jurisdiction or control have causally contributed to the collective
harm of global warming; a task which, in light of the contributions of others to the
same harm and the unclear concept of causation in international law, will likely prove
daunting. The fact that climate change is the result of the combined conduct of many
may prove to be an alluring counter-argument for a respondent State, particularly
if its contribution to global emissions consists of a small share, a claim which can
be made by virtually all States other than a select few such as the USA and China.
Together the USA, China and the EU account for 59.7 per cent of cumulative global
emissions as of 2017, with the next-ranked State, Russia, only accounting for about
6 per cent. Together the entirety of Africa, South America and Oceania account for
just 7.2 per cent of cumulative global emissions.
Nonetheless, there are glimmers of hope from domestic courts. In the recent
Urgenda case, the Government of the Netherlands had contended that it had not
breached its duty of care under Dutch tort law, as its contribution to global emissions
is minor, and reducing its emissions would make little difference on a global scale).
That argument was ultimately rejected by the Dutch Hoge Raad (Supreme Court),
which underlined the importance of calling a State to account for its share of
emissions because each reduction of greenhouse gas emissions has a positive
effect on combating dangerous climate change and, accordingly, no reduction is
negligible. A similar finding of State duties on the international plane would have a
great potential to shape the legal landscape across the broad field of community
interests in international litigation, with consequences far beyond the climate crisis.
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